Macdonald's commentary on structural models of the mobility table is both instructive and cautionary, but I disagree with much of it. I wrote some time ago that "Any number of models may imply the same set of oddsratios, and in this sense they will be equivalent. One such model may be transformed into another by multiplicative rescaling" (b, 453). Macdonald cites this passage as the point of his note, but he questions whether "the force of the known has been attended to." I believe it has, but Macdonald ignores relevant features of my several published analyses of occupational mobility classifications. In this note I will show how Macdonald's criticism is irrelevant to my analyses of mobility classifications. I will discuss conditions under which a modified form of Macdonald's criticism might be made, and I will argue that the criticism is empty in both its original and modified forms. Macdonald also fits a revised model to the FeathermanHauser (F-H) table of mobility of American men from father's occupation to son's first occupation, and I will show how that model is less appealing than the original F-H model.
Macdonald's Critique
Macdonald is correct that the model of his Table 2A yields the same expected frequencies with the same degrees of freedom as the model of his Table lA , taken from Featherman and Hauser (151, 155) .l Moreover, there are non-trivial differences between the column and level parameters of the two models; that is, the differences are in no way due to a change in normalization of the parameters. Macdonald consistently maintains that a model consists of its expecte-d frequencies-with allowance for the number of fitted parameters-and on this account, he argues, the equivalence between the models of Tables 1A and 2A renders suspect any interpretation of the former (or, I assume, of the latter).
If there were no other bases for model selection, I would agree with Macdonald, but I believe there are other reasons to prefer the F-H model of Table 1A to that of Table 2A . That is, Macdonald bases his refusal to choose between models on excessively limited criteria. His criteria are peculiarly narrow relative to those applied by most social scientists in modeling and interpreting data, and-more concretely-they ignore an explicit criterion for model selection used in Featherman and Hauser and Hauser (b) . Throughout these analyses, I emphasized the importance of symmetry in the array of interaction parameters, pointing both to its substantive implications for the correlation between occupational supply and recruitment and to its heuristic value in the specification of parsimonious models (Featherman and Hauser, Hauser, b, 437 ). Yet Macdonald never refers to this form of symmetry. If one applies this criterion to the models of Table 1A and Table 2A , the choice between the two becomes obvious: there is 1 asymmetry in the former case, but there are 7 in the latter.2
There is good reason to introduce the asymmetry between parameters of cells (2,l) and (1,2), but no others, in modeling the 1973 classification of mobility to first jobs. Under the model of quasi-symmetry in the full classification, the likelihood-ratio test statistic is 27.61 with 6 degrees of freedom.3 If we permit asymmetry between the interactions in cells (2,l) and (1,2), but no other pairs of cells, the test statistic falls to the statistically insignificant value of 7.98 with 5 degrees of freedom. There are 10 pairs of cells in which one might introduce a single asymmetry between interac-tions, but (2,l) and (1,2) are the only pair where the introduction of asymmetry leaves a nonsignificant residue. Thus, unlike the model of Table 2A,  the F-H model of Table 1A is parsimonious in introducing the single asymmetry in interactions that is both necessary and sufficient to interpret the data.
In a similar vein, Macdonald argues that an illustrative 3 by 3 table, constructed with 500 observations in cell (1,l) and 100 observations in each of the other 8 cells, can equivalently be modeled so as to locate interaction effects in other cells than the (1,l) cell, where I located the interaction by inspection. Imagine that you are analyzing this hypothetical table 9 times, but at each turn a different one of the 9 cell entries is unknown to you. When the contents of cell (1,l) are unknown, and only then, will you conclude that there is no association in the remainder of the table. That is the sense in which it is obvious by inspection that the model of Macdonald's Table 5A is to be preferred to the model of his Table 58 . Note that the latter model is asymmetric and, further, that it requires us to locate the interactions in two cells, rather than in one cell of the classification.
A MODIFIED CRITIQUE
Under certain conditions there are equivalent models which satisfy my criterion of symmetry as well as the criteria used by Macdonald, but his note fails to specify those conditions. Further, I believe that those conditions do not hold in the case of my models of American or British mobility classifications. To illustrate this, consider the display in Table 1 . Model A gives the locations of 7 interaction parameters in a hypothetical model. Note that the parameters are symmetric about the main diagonal, that parameters 1, 2, and 3 appear only in the intersection of rows 1, 2, and 3 with columns 1, 2, and 3, that parameters 4 and 5 appear only in the intersection of rows 4 and 5 with columns 4 and 5, and that parameters 6 and 7 appear only in the intersection of rows 4 and 5 with columns 1, 2, and 3 or in the intersection of columns 4 and 5 with rows 1,2, and 3. Under these conditions I can write an equivalent model by multiplying every entry in rows 4 and 5 and in columns 4 and 5 by any non-zero scalar. Model B of Table 1 is such an equivalent model.4 Moreover, Model B has the same number of parameters (7) as Model A, and those parameters are located symmetrically about the main diagonal of the table. By an appropriate choice of scalar multipliers, it is possible to reduce the number of parameters in the equivalent model. For example, in Model C I have set the parameter of cells (4,4), (4,5) and (5,4) equal to the parameter of cells (1,2), (2,2) and (2,1), thus reducing the number of parameters in the model from 7 to 6. Similarly, one could set the value of any one parameter in rows or columns 4 or 5 of Model A to be equal to the value of any other parameter that occurs outside of rows and columns 4 and 5. The resulting specifica- tion would remain symmetric, and it would require one less parameter than Model A. Surely this has cautionary implications, but so far as I can tell they do not apply to my analyses of British or American mobility classifications. That is, I do not believe it is possible to generate equivalent reparameterizations of any of my models of British or of American mobility classifications (within the levels framework) without introducing more asymmetries or increasing the number of parameters or both.5 The reason is that the parameters of my models are not separated between aggregates of rows and columns as are those of Model A in Table 1 . For example, rows and columns 4 and 5 of Macdonald's Table 1A may be rescaled symmetrically to set parameter 5 equal to parameters 4, 3 or 2; to set parameter 4 equal to parameters 5, 3 or 2; or to set parameter 1 equal to parameters 2, 3, 4 or 5. All of these models will be equivalent, but each also adds one new parameter to the F-H model of Table 1A .
Let me summarize the discussion to this point. Macdonald is correct in noting the existence of equivalent models that use the same number of parameters as some of my models of mobility tables. At the same time, his proposed equivalent models are unappealing because they introduce needless asymmetries into the arrays of interaction parameters. Under certain conditions, one can find equivalent models that are both parsimonious and symmetric, but these conditions do not hold in my models of mobility classifications.
STRUCTURE AND MODELS
Up to this point, I have worried along with Macdonald about the possibility of specifying equivalent models, but the fact is that I do not share his concern about the matter. I do not believe that a model consists only of a set of expected values, but it also (and mainly) consists of the structure or story that we use to interpret and explain those expected values. It is all well and good when a model has no equivalents, that is, when it carries unique implications for population data, but that is rare indeed in the social sciences. Most of the time, a model is no more than a vehicle for rendering a complete and internally consistent interpretation of a body of data in light of the ideas we draw from observation, theory, convention, or whatever. Sometimes, the model will illuminate a facet of a phenomenon in a way that we had not anticipated. Sometimes, the fit or findings of one model will lead us to reject other models. In the usual course of social scientific modeling, we are rarely in a position to regard the fit of one model to the data as grounds for rejecting all other models, but this is the standard against which Macdonald seeks to measure structural models of mobility. We can (and do) learn a great deal from models that fall far short of this goal, and I see no need to propose a special standard for mobility models.
Let me illustrate. Fitting a mobility classification is like fitting a variance-covariance matrix; indeed, there is more than analogy here. When we fit a variance-covariance matrix-say, with a regression analysis, a path model, a factor model, or whatever-do we throw up our hands at the thought that the same population moments might be implied by other than our preferred model? After all, when we regress Z on X and Y, that implies the same set of moments as the regression of X on Y and Z or the regression of Y on X and Z. No, we usually have some reason to think that X and Y cause Z and not otherwise, or we want to predict Z and not X or Y.
We set up the model the way we think things work, and we interpret the results in light of our presuppositions. We report the coefficients of the preferred model, not the moments estimated under it. We question the model if it yields parameter estimates that strain belief. We impose overidentifying restrictions on the data, and violations of these may lead us to reject the model. For example, we may say that X affects Z through Y in a zero-order causal chain, and we cannot maintain that model in the face of a non-zero partial relationship between X and Z. Yet other models imply the same zero partial. Our test treats only a necessary condition, but not a sufficient condition of the model. The same holds when we model a mobility classification. When we specify a simple model of a complex table, the degrees of freedom for error reflect the overidentifying restrictions of the model. We know that we can reject the model if we do not fit those restrictions within the limits of sampling error, but we do not know that the model is true when the restrictions are met. At that point, we have to decide whether we have reason enough to believe what the model says about the expected counts.
The real question, then, about the structural models of British and American mobility tables, is whether they tell a story worth hearing. In light of the fact that I used exploratory methods to specify those models, are they so free of content that there is no reason to prefer any of them to any equally parsimonious alternative? I think not. While I explored the data to specify the models, my procedures were neither mechanical nor ~n m o t i v a t e d .~
As discussed in Hauser (b, , I showed how models of mobility from father's occupation to son's first occupation and from son's first occupation to son's current occupation could be developed from such simple ideas as the clustering of observations on or near the main diagonal, the randomness of destinations in long-distance mobility, andas previously elaborated-the substantial equivalence of propensities toward movement in either direction between each pair of occupations. These are the ideas expressed by the models and elaborated through successive revisions of them. Of course, in modifying the models to fit the data, I ran the risk of overfitting. Ultimately, the only protection against that is crossvalidation (see below), but I also used various smoothing techniques in an effort to reduce the risk of overfitting the data. Minor differences in specification, on the order of those between the F-H model and that of Macdonald's Note 2, are about as consequential for interpretation as those ordinarily entailed by the addition or deletion of one or another coefficient in a system of recursive structural equations. Regardless of the uniqueness of the specifications, I believe that the models are of interest to the degree that the reader wants to pursue the implications of the ideas they express, and no further. If the reader has other ideas, other models may be of greater interest.
LEVELS AND ODDS
Macdonald argues that odds-ratios for adjacent rows and columns are more useful than parameters for individual cells because they are more compact and because they are unique (conditional upon an ordering of the categories). He uses such displays skillfully to elucidate the conditions under which equivalent models may or may not exist. I am reluctant to express my misgivings about the use of odds-ratios for adjacent rows and columns, for as Goodman (b) has shown, they are extremely useful when one posits or wishes to posit an ordering in one or both criteria of classification.' At the same time I believe that Macdonald overstates the usefulness of the array of C(i,j)-logs of odds-ratios-in the present context. He writes, "And whilst choice of a particular C(i,j) array involves an ordinality decision it is not one fraught with substantive import, for no claims about groupings of cells rest upon it, on changing it we are not led to unsay things previously said, and the alternatives are self-evidently equivalent." Macdonald appears to have missed one of the central features of my analysis, namely, that I was trying to avoid metric assumptions about occupations. In working with occupational data, I constantly choose between two forms of criticism. If I do not adopt a metric of occupational social standing, I am told that I have missed the central feature of the occupational structure, that it is a hierarchy.* If I do assume a metric, I am told that I have picked the wrong one. The two most common forms of the latter criticism are, first, that upper manual workers are higher in status than lower nonmanual workers and, second, that farmers are higher in status than lower manual workers. In Table 2 I have permuted the rows and columns of the display in Macdonald's Table 1A to reflect these two inversions, and in Table 3 I have displayed the C(i,j) for adjacent rows and columns of the permutation, using the notation of Macdonald's Table 3A wherever the same terms appear. It now takes six distinct terms (including zero) to describe the interaction in the classification, and the display of the C(i,j) contains two asymmetries. I do not believe that this display is "selfevidently equivalent" to that of Macdonald's Table 3(a), but the display in Table 2 is self-evidently equivalent to that of Macdonald's Table l(a). The moral is that it pays to be agnostic and flexible in deciding how to display the features of a model.
SEARCH STRATEGIES
In his Note 2 Macdonald argues that my computational strategies were needlessly complex. He is right, and in the passage that he cites, I recommended other strategies (Hauser, b, 418) . I can only wish that I had the computational facilities four and a half years ago-when I did the work that Macdonald criticizes-that either Macdonald or I have now. It is not news that one can improve the fit of the F-H model in Macdonald's Table  1A ; just this possibility is discussed in the source (Hauser, b, . It is also not news that mechanical search procedures can be used to improve fit; I implemented such an option, but found it unsatisfactory in comparison with a study of residuals at each round of specification (Hauser, a, 949; b, . Macdonald notes "the familiar dangers in mindless data-fitting," and I want to illustrate these by a comparison between the model of his Note 2 and the F-H model of his Table 1A . First, as shown above, the asymmetry between interactions in cells (2,l) and (1,2) is extremely important. Macdonald's revision of the model specifies two other asymmetries (between cells (3,2) and (2,3) and between cells (4,2) and (2,4)), but the fit of his model is still marginally improved by the introduction of a parameter for cell (2,l). (The test statistic declines by 3.6 with 1 degree of freedom.) Second, the asymmetry between interactions in cells (2,l) and (1,2) appears also in the table of mobility to first jobs in 1962. That is, in both the 1962 and the 1973 data, that asymmetry is larger than any other single asymmetry, and the remaining departures from quasi-symmetry are non-significant. The 1962 data on mobility to first jobs were not used to develop the model of the 1973 data, but they were used to cross-validate that model with some success (Hauser, b, Featherman and Hauser, . Third, when Macdonald's revised model is fitted to the aggregate table of mobility from father's occupation to son's first occupation in the 1962 data, the fit is inferior to that obtained when the F-H model of Table 1A is fitted to the same data; the test statistics are 64.6 and 38.2, respectively, in comparison with a test statistic of 4,334 under simple independence. At the same time, the performance of the two models is very similar in a second crossvalidation, carried out on a sample of 4,017 male Wisconsin high school graduates who were interviewed in 1975 (Sewell and H a~s e r ) .~ The test statistics are 18.7 and 20.8, respectively, in comparison with a test statistic of 838.4 under simple independence; neither model can be rejected at the .05 level. In sum, I do not believe that the model of Macdonald's Note 2 constitutes any improvement over the F-H model of his Table lA, but this is by no means to suggest that no improvement in the latter is possible.
Hope's Critique
Hope's commentary on mobility ratios calls for a response because of its strong and categorical assertions, "that values of the ratio are highly dependent on the model fitted to account for interaction, and that criticisms of Blau and Duncan's conclusions about the mobility of American society, which derive from application of the new ratio, cannot be sustained." Those assertions are wrong. l o
The first assertion-model dependence-is pointless as criticism because it is half right and half wrong. The right half expresses the main virtue of the mobility ratio; net of the error component, it is the interaction parameter of a multiplicative model (Hauser, b, 427) ." The other half of Hope's first assertion is wrong because there is nothing arbitrary or indeterminate about the choice of the model that determines the ratios. That is, unless one denies the virtues of parsimony or of theory, the second half of Hope's first assertion is meaningless. It is absurd to claim that the mobility ratio is arbitrary because it differs from parameters of any number of saturated models. My models are not saturated models, and they are empirically distinguishable from saturated models by dint of fit and parsimony. As Macdonald writes, "the saturated model always fits, the Hauser model not always." Hope's comparison of mobility ratios to parameters of the saturated model is so poorly conceived that I am left to wonder whether his commentary was an ineffectual effort to anticipate Macdonald's argument, to which I have responded above.12 It would be ironic indeed if Hope were trying to produce the sort of equivalent reparameterization discussed by Macdonald, for exactly the same equivalence holds between Hope's "diamond" model of the effects of mobility and status inconsis-tency and the square additive model that Hope (a) was criticizing. When House took note of this, Hope (b) came out foursquare for theory.
Hope's second assertion is "that criticisms of Blau and Duncan's conclusions about the mobility of American society, which derive from application of the new ratio, cannot be sustained." This is twice wrong. First, it is wrong because Hope's first assertion is wrong. Second, it is wrong because those criticisms of Blau and Duncan can be sustained without application of the new mobility ratio. I think it is important to elaborate the latter point because of its substantive implications.
Hope refers in his commentary to two of Blau and Duncan's conclusions with which Featherman and Hauser disagreed. First, he writes, "it is held that the new ratio shows that American society is a good deal less mobile at the top and bottom than was suggested by Blau and Duncan on the basis of the old mobility ratio." Consider the 1973 OCG table of mobility from father's occupation to son's first occupation, analyzed by Hope and by Macdonald, as well as by Featherman and Hauser and Hauser (b) . Under simple statistical independence, the (likelihood-ratio) chi-square statistic for this table is 6167.69 with 16 degrees of freedom; the immobility ratios in order, from cell (1,l) to cell (5,5), are 2.35, 1.56, 1.59, 1.39, and 3.46. Under the model of quasi-perfect mobility, the test statistic falls to 683.06 with 11 degrees of freedom. While quasi-perfect mobility does not fit the data, the fit is far better than in the case of simple independence. Thus, the diagonal parameters of this model-described by Hope as "exemplary"-provide a far better basis for interpretation of the data than do the immobility ratios under simple independence. The diagonal parameters under quasi-perfect mobility are 3.80, 1.35, 1.48, 1.63, and 18.13.13 Note that these values display exactly the same property, relative to the diagonal ratios under simple independence, as do the parameters of the model preferred by Featherman and Hauser. That is, they show greater immobility in the top and bottom categories than do the old mobility ratios. Hauser (b, displays other quasi-independence models that lead to the same result.
Hope also cites a passage in which Featherman and Hauser (178) criticize for identifying asymmetric flows of men with intrinsic barriers to exchange between occupations. While Featherman and Hauser do use their structural models of mobility to elucidate this criticism (152, 175) , they also use the model of quasi-symmetry to the same end (184-7). The model of quasi-symmetry merely constrains the interactions in the mobility classification to be invariant with respect to transposition of the classification. It has no necessary connection with the structural models developed by Featherman and Hauser or with the new mobility ratio.
A few other points in Hope's commentary warrant brief mention.
His effort to draw distinctions between Goodman's (a) models of quasiindependence and my models of mobility tables is confused. Hauser (b, elaborates the relationship between those models. Hope writes that one cannot assess fit in the F-H models as in the Goodman models, and this is incorrect. Hauser (c) discusses methods for assessing fit at each level of the model.14 Hope's confusion rests in part on what he terms the "twostage character of the quasi-independence model," which is modified in the F-H models. While this property is irrelevant to an evaluation of the F-H models, one can almost reproduce the F-H model of mobility to first jobs in 1973 using the "two-stage" notion. Fit a model of quasi-independence to the cells of the classification designated at level 5 in the F-H model of Tables 2, 3 , and 4) that the parameters of the F-H model are only renormalized by shifts in the reference point of row, column, or interaction effects, whereas parameters of saturated models are drastically altered by such shifts (Table 5) . 16 Readers of Featherman and Hauser will note their efforts to point out the invariance of the model with respect to such changes in normalization (156) and their use of two normalizations, one of which has a probability interpretation (153). Second, I agree fully with Hope that in the case of "any aspect of the model which is identified with a single degree of freedom . . . it makes sense to report the value of the parameter which accounts for that degree of freedom." This is exactly the case with each of the parameters of the F-H model. Notes 1. Macdonald creates the equivalent model (in his additive formulation) by adding the difference between interaction parameters 2 and 5 to column 3 and adding the difference between interaction parameters 2 and 4 to columns 2, 4, and 5. 2. In the F-H model of Table 1A the single asymmetry holds between cells (2,l) and (1,2). In the model of Table 2A there are asymmetries between cells (2,l) and (1,2), (3,l) and (1,3), (3,2) and (2,3), (4,l) and (1,4), (5,l) and (1,5), (4,3) and (3,4), and (5,3) and (3,5). 3. For further discussion of the model of quasi-symmetry, see Hauser (b, 437) or . 4. Without loss of generality, I have suppressed the renormalization of parameters in Models B and C of Table 1. 5. I leave tests of this claim as an exercise for the reader. It is possible to relax the condition illustrated in Table l without increasing the number of parameters in the equivalent model, but even the relaxed conditions are not met by any of my models of British or of American mobility classifications. This claim does not apply to other classes of models; Seppo Pontinen has suggested a parsimonious and equivalent crossings model of the American table that can be written with one asymmetry.
